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Introduction 
 
This case concerned the substantive prerequisites for involuntary treatment under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA).  The parties agreed that following  the European 
Court of Human Rights ruling in Herczegfalvy v. Austria, treatment for mental 
disorder could be enforced only if it were „medically necessary‟.1  At the core of the 
decision in Haddock was how this phrase is to be construed.  In particular, did 
Herczegfalvy require a two-part approach to the issue, first identifying with some 
certainty the disorder afflicting the patient and then determining whether the proposed 
treatment was necessary for that disorder, or could „medical necessity‟ instead be 
determined as a single, multi-faceted question?  Also at issue was the court‟s 
appropriate process and standard of review in such matters.  Because of developments 
in the factual evidence and in the relevant case law during the litigation, a variety of 
other factors were considered, most particularly the relevance of a review tribunal‟s 
classification of mental disorder to the court‟s view of an individual‟s diagnosis. 
 
At the commencement of the case, B, then aged 27, had been detained at Ashworth 
Special Hospital for nine years, having been diagnosed as suffering from 
psychopathic disorder. He had a history of violence, and was still considered to be at 
high risk of violent offending should he be moved outside a high-security institutional 
environment.  It was proposed to treat him with a course of anti-psychotic medication. 
While he had consented to some such treatment in the past, he was currently refusing 
all treatment, and it was thus proposed to treat him pursuant to section 58 of the 
MHA. 
 
Beyond this, most of the relevant facts were contested.  In particular, B‟s experts took 
the view that he was not suffering from a mental disorder at all, while the respondents 
took the view that B was affected by both psychopathic disorder and mental illness.  It 
was contested whether B lacked capacity to consent to the medical treatment 
proposed.  The prescription of anti-psychotics for B was also challenged, both on the 
basis that B was not suffering from a mental disorder at all, or alternatively that if he 
                                                 
1
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was, it was a personality disorder for which anti-psychotic medication was an 
inappropriate treatment.   
 
The application for judicial review was made prior to the House of Lords decision in 
R. (B) v Ashworth Hospital Authority.
2
  Consistent with the Court of Appeal decision 
in that case,
3
 B claimed that he could not be treated for mental illness, but only for the 
psychopathic disorder for which he was formally confined.  While he alleged he did 
not have a mental disorder at all, he further alleged that treatment with anti-psychotic 
medication did not constitute appropriate treatment for psychopathic disorder. 
Concurrent with the High Court application challenging the medical necessity of the 
treatment, the respondent RMO applied for B to be reclassified under section72(5) of 
the MHA, so that his detention would be justified both because of his psychopathic 
disorder and his mental illness.  Collins J. delayed his decision until the House of 
Lords judgment and the tribunal decision had been issued.   
 
While this process was no doubt the best that could be done under the circumstances, 
the result is unfortunate, as both the law and the factual landscapes became moving 
targets over the course of argument.  Overruling the Court of Appeal, the House of 
Lords decision in Ashworth held that sections 63 and 58 of the MHA allowed the 
involuntary treatment of patients for whatever disorder afflicted them, not merely for 
those contained within the category of disorder for which they were formally 
confined.  As a result, that aspect of B‟s case was abandoned.  The respondents had 
initially argued on the expectation that their application for re-categorisation would be 
successful.  It was not: the review tribunal remained convinced that B was suffering 
from psychopathic disorder such as warranted his continued confinement, but 
declined to expand the grounds for his confinement to include mental illness.  Thus 
both sides in the case were required to change gears mid-argument.  Their previous 
arguments still lingered on in the litigation, however, and temper the eventual reasons 
for judgment. 
 
Treatment without the competent consent of the patient under section 58 may only be 
administered upon the certification by a doctor other than the responsible medical 
officer (RMO) proposing the treatment that „having regard to the likelihood of its 
alleviating or preventing a deterioration of [the patient‟s] condition, the treatment 
should be given‟.4 This opinion must be provided by a doctor duly approved to 
provide such opinions – a so-called „second-opinion approved doctor‟ (SOAD).  The 
delay between commencement of the proceedings and the eventual first instance 
judgment was about a year, and the second and third respondents were SOADs who 
had authorised the treatment by antipsychotics in this period.   
 
 
First Instance Decision 
Without exception, Collins J. preferred the professional evidence presented on behalf 
of the respondents.  Relying on that evidence, he held that B did not have capacity to 
consent to the treatment in question.  His Lordship took the view that B suffered from 
personality disorder, complicated by at least occasional psychosis.
5
  Diagnoses were 
                                                 
2
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3
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4
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5
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in any event not clear cut, and different diagnoses might be reached for a given patient 
by different clinicians, or by the same psychiatrist at different times in the patient‟s 
illness.  He quoted favourably the review of a psychiatrist called on behalf of 
respondents to the effect that „the distinction between mental illness and personality 
disorder is probably more imagined than real‟.6  He concluded that Herczegfalvy 
should not be read as separately requiring both a certain diagnosis and proof that the 
proposed treatment was appropriate for the diagnosed disorder, suggesting that too 
great a focus on the specifics of diagnosis risked imposing strictures that bore little 
resemblance to the realities of clinical practice.  Treatment with antipsychotics had 
proven beneficial in the past, and it was clinically warranted in this case.  Further, he 
expressly doubted the view of B‟s expert, that antipsychotics were not an appropriate 
treatment for personality disorder.  The treatment was therefore justified in B‟s case. 
 
While this would have been sufficient to decide the case, His Lordship made a 
number of additional observations that warrant note.  The Court of Appeal in R. 
(Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority
7
 had held that when issues 
under the Human Rights Act were at issue, the court on a judicial review hearing was 
obliged to make a full assessment of the circumstances and to reach its own 
conclusions on matters of fact.  To this end, it was not restricted to the written 
evidence serving as the basis of the judicial review application, but was also entitled 
to hear witnesses.  His Lordship expressly doubted whether he would have reached 
such a conclusion as to the appropriate procedure, except for the binding precedent of 
Wilkinson.  The role of the SOAD was also discussed.  His Lordship stressed the 
importance of this safeguard, noting the duty to reach an assessment of the 
appropriateness and efficacy of the treatment independent from the RMO,
8
 and to 
provide reasons for the decision.
9
  The SOAD was further to have in mind the 
substantive standards implied by the Human Rights Act and ECHR.
10
  
 
 
Court of Appeal Decision 
 
The decision of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Auld L.J.  His Lordship viewed 
the central question on appeal to be similar to that described above, that is, whether 
the court need be satisfied both of the specific diagnosis of mental disorder 
experienced by an individual and that the treatment proposed was medically necessary 
for that disorder in order to uphold a decision that the individual will be forcibly 
treated.  The Court analysed this question from four overlapping approaches: whether 
this dual approach was required by Herczegfalvy; whether the domestic law imposed 
such a dualist approach, or whether the question of necessity could be approached as a 
single question, how far the court must take cognisance of the views of a MHRT 
regarding the form of the individual‟s mental disorder; and further to Wilkinson, the 
nature and intensity of review by the court. 
 
On the first two points, the Court held that neither Herczegfalvy nor domestic law 
required a two-stage assessment of necessity.  Like Collins J., the Court took the view 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. at [26]. 
7
 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 419. 
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that diagnosis in an inexact science in psychiatry, and may be changed at different 
times in the patient‟s illness.  As Baroness Hale had stated in Ashworth, the objective 
of the clinician should be to treat the whole patient.  ECHR safeguards „should not be 
deployed so as to cut across the grain of medical good practice.‟11  „Realism and 
practicality‟ were the order of the day.12  Considerable argument had been devoted to 
what standard of proof should be applied to the demonstration of medical necessity: 
beyond reasonable doubt, clear and convincing, or mere balance of probabilities.  The 
Court eschewed the fixing of an evidential standard of proof, holding instead that a 
finding of medical necessity was „a value judgment as to the future – a forecast – to 
be made by a court in reliance on medical evidence according to a standard of 
persuasion.‟13 Insofar as a standard were appropriate, it was to be decided on the 
balance of probabilities. 
 
Collins J. had taken the view that the previous courses of antipsychotics to which B 
had been subjected had improved his condition, and that was sufficient for purposes 
of both the ECHR and domestic law.  The Court held that he did so after a careful 
analysis of the evidence, and his view should therefore not be disturbed. 
 
Regarding the third issue, the Court held that decisions of the MHRT were about the 
propriety of detention, not diagnosis.  As such, the failure of the MHRT to say that B 
suffered from a mental illness of a nature and degree that it would be relevant to his 
continued confinement did not necessarily mean that B did not have a mental illness.  
Further, the MHRT did not find that B did not have a mental illness; it merely found 
that it was not convinced that he did have one, on the balance of probabilities.  Given 
the difficulties of diagnosis in psychiatric contexts, such a lack of certainty was 
unsurprising. 
 
Finally, the Court re-affirmed the principle in Wilkinson that where involuntary 
treatment under section 58 is challenged, the court must engage in a full merits 
review, including the hearing of witnesses where requested by the applicant. 
 
 
The survival of Wilkinson 
 
The Court of Appeal decision does bring some good news.  Collins J.‟s decision at 
first instance is but the most recent in a slow erosion of the decision in Wilkinson.  
The view of the Court of Appeal in R.(N) v. M had approached the case restrictively, 
holding that Wilkinson should not be viewed as „a charter for routine applications to 
the court for oral evidence in human rights cases generally‟.14 This hesitancy was 
repeated in challenges to involuntary psychiatric treatment in cases such as R. (PS) v. 
RMO. 
15
  The Court of Appeal in Haddock is markedly more expansive.  The patient 
challenging involuntary treatment under section 58(3)(b) is „entitled to require the 
attendance of witnesses to give evidence and to be cross-examined.‟16 This 
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 At [33]. 
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 At [39]. 
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 At [42]. 
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 [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1789 at [39].  
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 [2003] E.W.H.C. 2335 (Admin) at [22-3].   
16
 [64]. 
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formulation is mandatory: an applicant has a right to oral evidence, a right that the 
Court must grant subject only perhaps to a qualification based on relevance.    
 
At least for issues surrounding compulsory treatment under the MHA, this must be 
correct.  As the Court of Appeal notes, such decisions are outside the scope of 
MHRTs:  the application for judicial review is the first time the applicant‟s rights will 
be considered in a judicial context.  As such this is not simply a judicial review 
hearing where the issue is the reasonableness of administrative conduct; it is instead 
the only forum where the individual can have factual issues relevant to their rights 
under the Human Rights Act determined.  In Haddock neither party asked for the 
professional witnesses to be called to give oral testimony, and therefore the failure to 
call them was thus not open to criticism.  B‟s counsel did ask that B be called as a 
witness, a request that Collins J. declined, holding that „it did not seem to me that his 
evidence would conceivably assist me in reaching my decision‟.17  The Court of 
Appeal concurs with this approach.  While the requirement that evidence must be 
such as would assist the court may make sense as a general principle, the failure to 
call B warrants some discussion.  It creates a sense that B himself is somehow 
peripheral to the decision at issue. Collins J.stated that he was content to take B‟s 
written statement „at face value‟. 18  The medical evidence is analysed in considerable 
detail.  By comparison, B‟s statement is quoted only once, briefly, to the effect that 
his value system has long been opposed to medication, and that „for this reason … a 
number of medical reports, both recent and in the past, have been inaccurate, and have 
failed also to fairly or accurately reflect my views‟.19  In this statement, B calls into 
question the accuracy of the medical records upon which the Court relies in its 
decision.  If his statement was in fact being taken „at face value‟, it is difficult to see 
that such a challenge could be ignored, and if such a challenge were taken seriously, it 
is difficult to see that B‟s evidence would not assist the Court. 
 
Further, B‟s capacity was contested at first instance.  Consistent with some of the 
previous case law, Collins J. had taken the view that B‟s capacity was relevant to 
whether treatment should be enforced upon him.
 20
 The relevant evidence was 
disputed.  While there was certainly evidence consistent with a lack of capacity in the 
reports of some of the professionals testifying on behalf of the respondents, a 
psychiatrist and a professor of psychology testifying on behalf of B took the view that 
B was not suffering from a mental disorder at all.  Insofar as B‟s resistance to 
treatment was based on a similar belief, it is not obvious that it indicates a lack of 
capacity, even if the belief was erroneous.  Further, at least one of the experts 
testifying on behalf of the respondents viewed the finding that B lacked capacity as 
„highly debateable‟.21  If B‟s capacity is a matter of relevance, it is surprising that B‟s 
evidence was taken to be irrelevant, given the complexity of the determination of 
capacity. 
 
 
SOADs 
                                                 
17
 Supra n.5, at [14]. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. at [28]. 
20
 Supra n.5, at [8] quoting para 16.21 of the Code of Practice;  at [10], quoting Simon Brown L.J. in 
Wilkinson at [30]. 
21
 Ibid., at [29]. 
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The High Court and Court of Appeal adopt rather different approaches to the role of 
the SOAD.  For Collins J. the SOAD is to be a meaningful safeguard for persons 
potentially subjected to treatment without consent.  He reminds us of the processes 
with which they must comply prior to providing their opinion, including consultation 
with two members of the treatment team who are not doctors.
22
  He further quotes the 
relevant portions of the Code of Practice, noting the need for the SOAD to form an 
independent view of the appropriateness of treatment, based on the consensus view of 
appropriate treatment for the condition, the therapeutic efficacy of the treatment, the 
reasons for any capable refusal of the patient, any other options for treatment, and the 
patient‟s experience of similar treatments and episodes of a similar disorder. 23  He 
notes the duty of an SOAD to provide reasons for his or her decision.
 24
 While the 
Court of Appeal does acknowledge the need of the SOAD to form an independent 
view,
25
 the Court appears to view the role of the SOAD as much less rigorous: 
 
Plainly, the notion of „likelihood‟ in section 58(3)(b) should, if possible, be 
construed compatibly with ECHR jurisprudence.  But the SOAD's task is a 
medical one, to be undertaken on the Bolam principle, which is likely in 
almost all cases to involve consideration of the best interests of the patient, 
and may also take into account non-clinical factors;… However, it does not, 
and could not, properly include a conclusion by him as to whether his decision 
is a Convention compliant application of the section 58(3)(b) threshold of  
„likelihood‟ of therapeutic benefit.26  
 
The expectation that the SOAD will adopt a Bolam approach, approving the treatment 
if it is consistent with a reasonable body of medical opinion, is cause for concern.  
While certainly SOADs should be receptive to different professional approaches, 
Bolam is a test of professional negligence.  It would significantly reduce the value of 
the SOAD as a safeguard, if his or her role were merely to ensure that a patient was 
not treated negligently.  The SOAD role would add nothing to the common law 
standard, applicable in any event:  it would provide no new substantive safeguard to 
the patient.  It is difficult to see that this is the intent of the legislation.  As noted 
above, the movement elsewhere in law is to tighten up the decision-making criteria, 
so that a standard higher than Bolam is expected; it is not obvious why such a move 
should be resisted in the current context. 
 
 
Herczegfalvy 
 
The Court of Appeal took as its starting point the decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Herczgelfavy v. Austria.  In that case, the Court ruled that: 
     
 The established principles of medicine are admittedly in principle decisive in 
such cases; as a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot 
                                                 
22
Ibid. at [8]. 
23
 Ibid. [8-11]. 
24
Ibid. at [16]. 
25
At [9]. 
26
 At  [34]. 
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be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy 
itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist.
27
 
 
 
The Court of Appeal adopted a rather broad reading of Heczegfalvy, noting that: 
 
The section 58(3) power to treat a patient capable of consent against his will or 
a patient incapable of consent is potentially a violation of his Article 3 right 
not to be subjected to degrading treatment and/or his Article 8 right to respect 
for his private life. However, it is common ground that, while the risk of 
infringement of those rights may be greater when the patient is capable of 
giving or refusing consent, it is not necessarily an infringement to treat him 
against his will where such treatment can be convincingly shown to be 
medically or therapeutically necessary.  
 
Such a reading of Herczegfalvy is not appropriate.  Mr Herczegfalvy lacked capacity 
to make the specific treatment decisions at issue, had been held to lack capacity by a 
court, and had had a substitute decision-maker appointed on his behalf who had been 
consulted and agreed throughout to the treatments at issue.  When the ECtHR refers to 
„such cases‟, it is referring to people who are „entirely incapable of deciding for 
themselves‟. 28  
 
The factual, and arguably historical,
29
 context of Herczegfalvy should therefore not be 
lost.  Medical necessity is only part of the picture, and the case has nothing to say 
about refusals of treatment by competent patients.  Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR have 
a rich and expanding case law which will no doubt raise new issues before the ECtHR 
relating to psychiatric treatment.
30
   Herczegfalvy shows the ECtHR dipping its toe for 
the first time into the waters of psychiatric treatment.  It should be understood as the 
Court‟s first word on the subject, but certainly not its last.  In this context, there is a 
certain artificiality about asking whether the Herczegfalvy test should be read as one 
question or two. The judgment does not provide a detailed approach:  the ECtHR 
deals with his entire Article 3 complaint in five paragraphs.  There was no dispute as 
to Mr Herczegfalvy‟s diagnosis; merely on the appropriateness of treatment. It is not 
necessarily helpful to become too fixated on how the Court would have answered a 
question it was not asked.  
 
None of this necessarily means that compulsory treatment cannot be compliant with 
the ECHR.  It does, however, serve as a warning sign:  we cannot assume that the 
provisions of the MHA, which provide no safeguards for the first three months of 
treatment and only minimal procedural safeguards thereafter, will be found to be 
compliant by the Strasbourg court.  That is the pending crisis.  A debate as to whether 
the Herczegfalvy test involves one question or two is unlikely to progress us very far 
in its resolution.  A proper debate about the appropriate safeguards to involuntary 
                                                 
27
 At  [12]. 
28
 (1993)  15  E.H.R.R. 437, at [82]. 
29
 The case pre-dates the standards relating to psychiatric facilities of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CPT/Inf/E (2002 1, pp. 52-
62, originally published as part of the Committee‟s  8th General Report, CPT/Inf (98) 12. 
30
 See P. Bartlett,  O. Lewis and O. Thorold, Mental Disability and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 2006) ch 3 and 4. 
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treatment belongs at first instance in the legislative realm.  The Government has 
shown no stomach for engaging in such a debate.  Even when intending an extensive 
re-writing of the current MHA, substantive criteria for involuntary treatment were 
few.  Now that the government has retreated from that more ambitious programme of 
reform, it looks as though it intends no reform at all for the provision of substantive 
criteria for compulsory treatment.  This is unfortunate, as it means policy reform is 
likely to be driven on a case-by-case basis, followed by hurried and reactive 
legislative responses. 
 
 
Medical Necessity and Human Rights 
 
In a relatively short case note, it is barely possible to commence a discussion of how 
we might conceptualise justified cases of compulsory treatment in the context of 
human rights.  A few thoughts flowing from the reasons for judgment of Collins J. 
and Auld L.J. are nonetheless appropriate. 
 
In the English tradition, reflected in the drafting of the ECHR, human rights are in 
essence about individual freedom and the limits of state power.  Certainly, other 
human rights discourses have modified that to some degree by conceptualising human 
rights as a floor to substantive standards of living, but the core of the ECHR Articles, 
drafted in the response to authoritarian governments in pre-war Europe, is about 
controlling the state and protecting individual freedom. Non-consensual treatment is 
thus a constitutional question.  We should therefore be hesitant about adopting models 
from tort, such as Bolam:  they are not designed to resolve constitutional issues.  
Treatment without consent of people with capacity raises important issues, as the 
autonomy of the individual is overruled by the authority of the state.  There is a line of 
argument that maintains that involuntary treatment should be able to follow from 
involuntary confinement.  As Baroness Hale states in Ashworth, „once the state has 
taken away a person‟s liberty and detained him in a hospital with a view to medical 
treatment, the state should be able (some would say obliged) to provide him with the 
treatment which he needs.‟ 31  From a human rights perspective, this is not as clear as 
this quotation suggests.  Forced physical confinement is quite a different intervention 
into liberty from the introduction of drugs into an individual‟s body.  While many 
certainly find the beneficial effects of the drug treatments outweigh the adverse 
effects, this does not change the fact that they act within the body, and are as such 
extraordinarily intrusive.  The recent policy trends have stressed the confinement of 
people that are dangerous, for public safety.  If we understand that to be the state‟s 
justification for confinement, the public safety aim is accomplished with the 
confinement.  It is not obvious what the further state objective would be, that would 
justify an additional infringement on the individual‟s liberty to make treatment 
decisions when he or she has capacity to do so.  
 
The Court of Appeal decision acknowledges that the right to be free from enforced 
treatment is based on a recognition of the importance of individual autonomy: 
 
invasion [i.e., involuntary treatment] of a mentally disordered person's being 
and privacy without his consent should, in any civilised system of law, only be 
                                                 
31
 [2005] U.K.H.L. 20 at [31]. 
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permissible on clear proof of medical necessity, which is a composite of a 
number of considerations.
32
  
 
Involuntary treatment – psychiatric or otherwise – is an invasion of an individual‟s 
autonomy, and requires a clear legal structure if it is to be justified.  If we are to take 
human rights seriously in this context, that structure must contain both procedural and 
substantive elements, and be clear enough to provide meaningful guidance to 
practitioners and patients alike.  It is here that the approach of the English courts 
becomes problematic.  The Court of Appeal continues: 
 
These include the likelihood of the treatment benefiting the patient 
therapeutically and/or otherwise for his protection and/or for the protection of 
others, the availability of viable alternatives and -- to the extent that they may 
not be covered by therapeutic benefit -- the best interests of the patient.
 33
  
 
The first difficulty with this list is that it does not reflect a coherent view of the 
constitutional question, but instead reflects a range of policy goods and other health 
law standards.  This is most clear regarding therapeutic benefit and best interests:  
simply because a treatment may benefit an individual, it does not follow that the state 
is justified in enforcing the treatment on the individual.  The state does not consider 
itself justified in so doing for physical disorders; it is not obvious why mental 
disorders should lead to a different result.  Second, no guidance is provided as to how 
the items identified are to be weighted against each other, nor how effective a 
treatment must be in achieving these aims.  As such, the approach fails both on the 
constitutional question, and the problem of practicality:  the criteria do not make it 
clear why is the state justified in intervening in the individual‟s life; nor do they 
provide a framework of sufficient clarity that a reasonably competent practitioner will 
receive adequate guidance as to how to proceed in individual cases.   
 
Both Auld L.J. and Collins J. stress the intrinsic difficulties in the practice of 
psychiatry.  Auld L.J. warns that „the safeguards of the ECHR should not be deployed 
so as to cut across the grain of medical good practice‟. 34  The risk of this, it would 
seem, flows from inherent difficulties of psychiatric practice: 
 
First, the discipline of psychiatry is one which, notoriously, poses particular 
difficulties of diagnosis and distinction between mental illness in a clinical 
sense and personality disorders or other failings. An overly prescriptive or 
compartmentalised treatment of the processes provided by the Act, with a 
view to attempting precise and mutually exclusive diagnoses, would bear little 
relationship to the practicalities of psychiatrists' therapeutic and associated 
forensic work.
 35
  
 
This is an odd argument from a human rights standpoint, as it suggests that the fact 
that an area is fraught with uncertainty is a justification for restricting human rights 
protection within that area.  If we are serious that treatment without consent 
constitutes an „invasion‟, to use Auld L.J.‟s word, it would instead seem that enforced 
                                                 
32
 At [6]. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 At [33]. 
35
 At [36]. 
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interventions in such uncertain circumstances ought to be approached with particular 
caution.  If we accept that enforced treatment is a constitutional question, it is far from 
clear that the state is more justified in restricting an individual‟s rights in cases where 
the knowledge base of the intervention is so fluid. 
 
It is also necessary to question the deference shown to the medical profession.  
Similar arguments apply whenever human rights protections cut across professional 
practice.  No doubt police officers and prison guards, for example, feel themselves 
undercut by the safeguards provided by the ECHR and other human rights legislation.  
We would nonetheless not argue that „the safeguards of the ECHR should not be 
construed so as to cut across the grain of good policing‟.  To do so would make 
human rights subject to professional practices that do not necessarily place human 
rights high on the professional agenda.  If we believe in human rights as at the core of 
our constitutional democracy, they cannot be made subservient to professional 
practice. 
 
In Haddock, Collins J. was notably hesitant to insist that professional practice be 
justified by hard evidence.  B‟s expert witness had called into question the 
appropriateness of treatment with antipsychotic medication for personality disorder.  
He acknowledged that such treatment was used by some clinicians, but stated that the 
evidence base for its efficacy was weak.  Evidence-based practice is not a new 
concept in medicine; it seems not unreasonable to insist that practitioners wishing to 
treat persons without consent should at the very least be able to demonstrate a solid 
and objective foundation for their belief that the treatment would be beneficial to the 
patient.  Even a superficial trawl of the literature would suggest that a more careful 
analysis would have been appropriate.  The Cochrane Collaboration, the leading 
repository of meta-studies of medical treatments, contains an analysis of 
pharmacological treatment for borderline personality disorder.
36
   It concludes that 
„Evidence of the effects of commonly prescribed drugs is poor but not without some 
areas of hope.‟37 Its optimism is however directed primarily at anti-depressants, not 
anti-psychotics.  Either way, it notes that „pharmacological treatment of people with 
BPD is not based on good evidence from trials‟.38  The judgment does not tell us 
whether B was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder or some other form of 
personality disorder – indeed, the Court declines to make a finding regarding 
diagnosis.  Nonetheless, the similarity between the Cochrane review and the views of 
B‟s expert are striking, and suggest that more careful investigation and analysis by the 
Court might well have been appropriate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The outcome of the Haddock case would appear to be that any rights under Articles 3 
or 8 of the ECHR to be free from involuntary treatment are to be subject to the 
professional practice of the psychiatric profession:  that is not to be subject to 
significant scrutiny.  The survival of Wilkinson is a significant victory for a rights-
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based approach, but it can only have substantive effect if, the courts couple it with 
clear and substantive safeguards that must be met prior to the imposition of 
involuntary treatment.  The substantive discussion in Haddock shows how little 
advance has been made in articulating a framework robust enough to pass human 
rights scrutiny, and clear enough to assist practitioners. 
